Scope of the General Denial by Crum, Charles Liebert
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 27 Number 1 Article 4 
1951 
Scope of the General Denial 
Charles Liebert Crum 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Crum, Charles Liebert (1951) "Scope of the General Denial," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 27 : No. 1 , 
Article 4. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol27/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For 
more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
SCOPE OF THE GENERAL DENIAL
CHARLES LIEBERT CRUM*
It is worth remembering in considering problems of plead-
ing in North Dakota that only two years ago the one hun-
dredth anniversary of the Field Code of Civil Procedure, the
basic pleading law of North Dakota, was observed by a group
of distinguished lawyers.!
North Dakota adopted the Field Code of Civil Procedure in
1868, incorporating the amendments which had been added
to it by the California legislature.' Our law of pleading is
therefore 82 years old. Since it was adopted, many changes
have come and gone in the field of pleading and in procedural
law in general. Many states have adopted provisions, based
upon years of experience with the problems of the Field Code,
which represent improvements over the provisions of David
Dudley Field's celebrated attempt to prescribe a uniform, sim-
ple system of procedure. The federal courts, after calling in a
committee of nationally recognized experts, have adopted a
new and simplified system of pleading and procedure which
it has been suggested might well be considered for use in
North Dakota.'
All of this has come about primarily because it has been
recognized that procedural law is a field of law which re-
quires constant, watchful attention.' Substantive law is often
of such character that it requires only minor changes
to remain up to date, but it has been said by one of the ac-
knowledged masters of the law of pleading that "unless plead-
ing rules are subject to constant examination and re-
valuation, they petrify and become hindrances, not aids, to the
administration of justice."'
One portion of the law of pleading which it is submitted is
ripe for re-examination consists of the rules which have
grown up around the general denial permitted by the Field
Code. Based as it is upon a common law development of
pleading which was very unusual in character, the general
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota.
See Reppy, The Field Codification Concept in Field Centenary Essays 17 (1949).
Viesselman, Dakota Practice § 2 (1930); Preface to N. D. Rev. Code of 18951
p. V.
3 See Lanier, Should North Dakota Adopt the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?,
26 N. D. Bar Briefs 153 (1950).
4 Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 459-60 (1943).
5 Clark, Code Pleading § 12 (2d ed. 1947).
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denial presents a serious obstacle toward the development of
a clear and concise system of pleading which serves to notify
both parties of the issues to be litigated.
The general denial is simply a pleading which denies every
material allegation of the plaintiff's complaint.! In form it is
ordinarily very brief and simple:
"For his answer to the complaint of the plaintiff herein,
the defendant denies each and every allegation of the com-
plaint.'
Despite this superficial simplicity, however, the plea pre-
sents a series of complex and difficult problems Before con-
sidering the present status of the plea, it may be well 'to con-
sider briefly the history which underlies it.
As it now exists, the general denial is the lineal descendant
of the plea of the general issue permitted under the common
law system of special pleading.! Modern legal thinking recog-
nizes pleading for what it actually is-a branch of the law of
procedure which has as its chief object the furnishing of
notice to the adversary party of the claims and defenses
which it is proposed to present in a pending legal proceed-
ing." But at common law, pleading was regarded as being an
end in itself instead of as a means to an end. Holdsworth
states that the three main characteristics of common law
pleading were its "precision, subtlety, and technicality" and
adds that it was regarded as "the most exact, if the most oc-
cult, of the sciences."'
a Pomeroy, Code Remedies § 533 (1904).
7 Clark, Code Pleading 584 (2d ed. 1947); Phillips, Code Pleading § 331 (2d
ed. 1932).
' "No topic connected with the whole subject of pleading is... more important
than the questions thus suggested." Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note 6, § 543.
The relationship can be clearly traced through such cases as McLarren v.
Spalding, 2 Cal. 510 (1852) and Gavin v. Annan, 2 Cal. 494 (1852), both of which
held that the general denial permitted by the Field Code was identical in scope with
the plea of the general issue permitted at common law. In McLarren v. Spalding a
tenant being sued for rent was allowed to prove that lie had been evicted from
the premises under a general denial, the court stating that the plea of tie general
denial was substantially equivalent to a plea of nil debet at common law. In Gavin
v. Annan the defense of accord and satisfaction was held admissible under a general
denial for the same reason. Both cases were overruled by Piercy v, Sabin, 10 Cal.
.22 (1858).
'o Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 460 (1943).
9 Holdsworth, History of English Law 263 (1926).
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Exact and precise, to the point of logical absurdity, the com-
mon law system of pleading certainly was. It had as its theo-
retical object the presentation of but a single point or issue
to the jury for settlement." To this end, when a plaintiff had
presented a complaint, the common law imposed on the de-
fendant the duty of doing one of two things: he might tra-
verse (take issue with) all or some of the allegations found
in the complaint, or he might admit the truth of the matters
alleged in the plaintiff's pleading and plead new matter to
avoid the legal consequences flowing from his admission." To
the doing of these two things, the common law system of
pleading rather rigidly restricted the defendant. He could not,
for example, deny the allegations of the declaration by plead-
ing a set of facts at variance with the complaint. This ren-
dered the pleading subject to demurrer on the ground that it
contained an argumentative denial."
As a practical matter, however, it was generally simpler
to deny or traverse the allegations of the complaint than ad-
mit them and plead new matter. This was because the com-
mon law system called for a further pleading on the part of
the plaintiff once the defendant had confessed the truth of
the plaintiff's declaration and avoided the legal effect of the
confession by pleading new matter in avoidance. Thus, if a
plaintiff pleaded a debt arising from contract and the defen-
dant pleaded payment-a defense which admitted the con-
tract and the former existence of the debt but avoided the
effect of the admission by adding the new point that the
debt had been paid-the single issue which was the objec-
tive of common law pleading had not been formed until the
plaintiff had either traversed the new matter by denying
payment or had in turn pleaded matter which confessed the
plea of payment and avoided its effect."
It was easier, therefore, to bring matters to a head at once
by simply taking issue with the allegations of the plaintiff's
2 Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at Common Law 353 (1898).
22 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 11, at 269, 287.
14 Day v. Wamsley, 33 Ind. 145 (1870); Spencer v. Southwick, 9 Johns. 314
(N. Y. 1812). See Pendleton County v. Amy, 13 Wall. 297, 803 (U. S. 1871).
1 The process of confessing and avoiding outlined above could be carried on al-
most indefinitely. Thus, the plaintiff's declaration was followed by the defendant's
plea (answer). Then followed a "replication" by the plaintiff, a "rejoinder" by
defendant, "surrejoinder" by plaintiff, "rebutter" by defendant, and "surrebut.
ter' by plaintiff. Phillips, Code Pleading §§ 86, 87 (2d ed. 1982).
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declaration, thereby cutting short the complicated process
of further pleading which was required following a plea in
confession and avoidance. By simply pleading the general
issue the common law pleaders found they could avoid the
reefs awaiting them once they embarked on the sea of special
pleading. The popularity of the plea of the general issue with
the common law pleaders may be in part explained on the
theory that it was a practical method of simplifying a sys-
tem of pleading which had grown too technical for successful
application."
But a further explanation of the use of the general issue by
the. common law pleaders may be found. The verbalistic pre-
cision of the common law courts had early led them to admit
proof of practically any matter which went to show that
the plaintiff did not have a right of recovery when the case
came to trial. This was particularly true of the general issue
when used in the actions of debt and assumpsit." So construed,
the general issue was an ideal tactical weapon for a defen-
dant. It permitted him to keep his adversary in the dark
as to his defense until the last minute.' The scope of the mat-
ter admissible under the general issue varied slightly with
the form the plea took. Thus, nil debet, the general issue in
actions of debt, was at one time construed to let in defenses
which would not have been admissible under the plea of non
assumpit, for the reason that the plea of nil debet was couch-
ed in the present tense, "there is now no debt owing from the
defendant to the plaintiff," while the plea of non assumpsit
was couched in the past tense: the defendant denied that
he had undertaken to pay. Because of these slight differ-
ences in point of grammatical form, anything which showed
that there was no debt owing when the case came on for trial,
including matter in confession and avoidance, was held to
be admissible under the plea of nil debet; under the plea of
non assumpsit, because in form it denied only the defendant's
undertaking to pay, the defendant was restricted to proof
16 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 11, at 263 et seq.
U Draper v. Glassop, 1 Ld. Rymd. 153, 91 Eng. Rep. 999 (1702); Anonymous,
1 Salk. 278, 91 Eng. Rep. 243 (1690); Fitz v. Freestone, 1 Mlod. 210, 86 Eng. Rep.
834 (1676) ; Beckford v. Clark, 1 Sid. 236, 82 Eng. Rep. 1079 (1665).
18 Young v. Rummell, 2 Hill 478 (N. Y. 1842); 22 Halsbury, Laws of England
429 (1912); Chitty, Pleading 476 et seq. (11th Am. ed. 1851). See Johnson v. Para-
mour, 12 Mod. 376, 88 Eng. Rep. 1390 (1701).
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which showed he had never made the promise declared on."
Yet matter in confession and avoidance eventually became
admissible to some extent under all forms of the general
issue." Objection to this practice on the ground it produced
surprise and injustice was repeatedly made; but we find it
said in one early New York case that "the objection...has
been disregarded a hundred times. '
The result was that the common law system allowed almost
unlimited proof of any possible defense under the plea of the
general issue. A cursory listing might include as examples
of such defenses the statute of frauds,' res judicata," pay-
ment,' the statute of limitations," release," discharge of con-
tract, 7 truth in actions of slander and libel,' accord and satis-
faction," lack of title in actions of trespass,' infancy," and
illegality."
The adoption of the Field Code of Civil Procedure through-
out most American states operated to narrow very consider-
ably the scope of the evidence admissible under the general
denial." The North Dakota statute follows closely the lan-
guage of the original Field Code provision:
"The answer of the defendant must contain:
1. A general or specific denial of each material allega-
tion of the complaint controverted by the defendant, or of
19 See cases cited note 17, supra.
20 See, e. g., Anonymous, 1 Salk. 278, 91 Eng. Rep. 243 (1690); Burrows v.
Jemino, 2 Str. 733, 93 Eng. Rep. 815 (1726); Season v. Gilbert, 2 Lev. 144, 83
Eng. Rep. 490 (1675); 22 Halsbury, Laws of England 429 (1912).
2 See Young v. Rummell, 2 Hill 478, 480 (N. Y. 1842).
2 Buttermere v. Hayes, 5 M. & W. 456, 151 Eng. Rep. 193 (1839).
23 Young v, Rummell, 2 Hill 478 (N. Y. 1842); Burrows v. Jemino, 2 Str. 733, 93
Eng. Rep. 815 (1726).
24 Fitz v. Freestone, 1 Mod. 210, 86 Eng. Rep. 834 (1796), semble.
2 Anonymous, 1 Salk. 278, 91 Eng. Rep. 243 (1690), semble; Draper v. Glassop,
1 Ld. Rymd. 153, 91 Eng. Rep. 999 (1702), semble.
" Beckford v. Clarke, 1 Sid. 236, 82 Eng. Rep. 1079 (1665).
27 Abbot v. Chapman, 2 Lev. 81, 83 Eng. Rep. 459 (1674).
2 Smithies v. Harrison, 1 Ld. Rymd. 727, 91 Eng. Rep. 1385 (1706).
2 See Paramour v. Johnson, 1 Ld. Rymd. 566, 91 Eng. Rep. 1278 (1705).
30 Argent v. Durrant, 8 T. R. 403, 101 Eng. Rep. 1457 (1789).
31 Darby v. Boucher, 1 Salk. 279, 91 Eng. Rep. 244 (1795).
22 See Hussey v. Jacob, 5 Mod. 175, 87 Eng. Rep. 591 (1700).
" The English also drastically restricted the scope of the defenses provable under
the general issue 14 years before the Field Code of Civil Procedure was drafted. See
the rules of Hilary term, 1834, a set of rules of pleading adopted by the English
courts, 5 Barn. & Adolph. i-xx, 27 Eng. Com. Law 470 et seq.
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any knowledge or information thereof sufficient to form
a belief; and
2. A statement of any new matter constituting a de-
fense or counterclaim in ordinary and concise language
without repetition.""
Considered from the functional standpoint, this section
raises several important problems. First and foremost among
these is the question of what is included in the definition of
"new matter constituting a defense" which the section re-
quires to be contained in the answer.
Actually, the distinction conventionally made by the courts
in defining new matter which must be specially pleaded to be
admissible in evidence omits an important class of pleas."
Thus, the rule generally quoted by the courts is that any
proof which tends to show that the plaintiff never had a cause
of action, i. e., that the facts alleged in the complaint are un-
true, is theoretically admissible under the general denial."
On the other hand, the courts state that anything which
admits the existence of the facts alleged in the complaint but
avoids their legal effect by setting up additional facts which
show that the plaintiff's right of recovery has been destroyed
by some further transaction constitutes an affirmative de-
fense and must be specially pleaded. Thus, in First State Bank
v. Radke," the North Dakota court stated that "new matter
constituting a defense" includes only "matter which... ad-
mitting the alleged cause of action nevertheless sets up facts
which at the time when the action is brought show that the
plaintiff is not entitled to recover."
Manifestly, the classification thus adopted has its origin
in the common law requirement that the defendant must
answer uie plaintiff's declaration by either denying the al-
legations contained in it or by setting up new matter in
'S N. D. Rev. Code j 28-0710 (1948).
3 Thyson, The General Denial in Missouri, 26 Wash. U.L.Q. 898 (1941).
' First State Bank v. Radke, 51 N. D. 246, 199 N. W. 980 (1924); Hagen v.
Klabo, 18 N. D. 319, 100 N. W. 847 (1904).
57 51 N. D. 246, 264, 199 N. W. 930, 937 (1924).
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confession and avoidance." The fact that this classification
leaves out several types of defenses can be appreciated most
easily by applying the ordinary rules to a specific fact situation.
Assume that John Jones brings an action against Peter
Smith, his complaint alleging that Smith entered into an
agreement to sell 100 bushels of wheat and has failed to per-
form. The fact may be that this is true but that Smith prompt-
ly made a settlement with Jones. May Smith show this fact
under a general denial?
No, say the courts." The general denial simply denies that
Smith and Joneg ever entered into a contract at all. The plea
of accord and satisfaction, on the other hand, admits that a
contract was made but adds a new set of facts which tend
to show that Smith is not now liable for the breach of it."°
This is matter in confession and avoidance; it cannot be shown
under the general denial because it would tend to produce
surprise and injustice.
But the fact may be that Smith never entered into a con-
tract at all. Possibly Jones made an offer to purchase the
wheat but Smith never accepted it. May this be shown under
a general denial?
Yes, say the courts. Proving the facts that Smith never
entered into a contract directly negatives the allegations of
Jones' complaint by showing that Jones never had a cause of
action. Therefore no additional matter has been added to the
case. Jones put the question of whether or not there was a
contract in issue by pleading that Smith entered into a con-
tract with him.
As a broad general rule, therefore, defenses in confession and avoidance must
be specially pleaded. This was early established as the true construction of the Field
Code provision dealing with the answer by the case of McKyring v. Bull, 16 N. Y.
297 (1857), which held that evidence of payment as a defense was inadmissible
under a general denial on the ground it was matter in confession and avoidance. By
dictum the same holding was suggested for release, accord and satisfaction, and ar-
bitration. It is of interest to note that the North Dakota court, while adopting the
principle of McKyring v. Bull, has rejected its holding. Payment is therefore ad-
missible as a defense under the general denial in North Dakota. Hughes v. Wachter,
61 N. D. 513., 238 N. W. 776 (1931); Brown v. Forbes, 6 Dak. 273, 48 N. W. 93
(1889).
3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (c).
40 Harvey v. Denver Ry., 44 Colo. 258, 99 Pac. 31 (1908); Grand Lodge v.
Grand Lodge, 83 Conn. 241, 76 Atl. 538 (1910); Crilly v. Royle, 87 Neb. 367, 127
N. W. 251 (1910); Dibble v. Dimick, 143 N. Y. 549, 38 N. E. 724 (1894). See
Poer v. Johnson, 48 Ind. App. 596, 96 N. E. 189 (1911); Jacobs v. Day, 5 Misc.
410, 25 N. Y. Supp. 763, 765 (1893).
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Thus far, so good. But suppose that Smith's defense is that
the contract was illegal. Obviously, two views of such a de-
fense are possible. Looked at in one way, the defense of il-
legality should be provable under the general denial. It may
be argued that an illegal contract is not a. contract at all.
Consequently, by proving that the contract was illegal, Smith
has disproved an essential element of Jones' case. Jones is
bound to establish that a valid, binding contract was entered
into before he can recover. The existence of a binding con-
tract is indispensable to his cause of action. Therefore, by
showing that the contract between himself and Jones was
never valid, Smith merely disproves an element of Jones'
case. Under this tlheory, it has been held that the defense of
illegality is admissible under the general denial.'
Looked at from a slightly different angle, however, it can
logically be argued that Smith is obligated to plead the de-
fense of illegality. Jones' denial would simply operate to
place in issue the question of whether or not Jones and Smith
had actually done the acts alleged in the complaint. Based on
this view of the function of the general denial, it can be
argued that the defense of illegality does not negative any
of the facts alleged in the complaint; indeed, illegality is a
defense to the action only if all the facts alleged in the com-
plaint are conceded, since if Smith and Jones never made a con-
tract at all it is irrelevant that the contract they might have
41 Goodrich v. Northwestern Telephone Co., 161 Minn. 106, 201 N. W. 290 (1924).
The element of public policy has had some influence here, since the courts have held
that it is their duty to refuse recovery on an illegal contract even where the issue
of illegality is not raised by the pleadings. Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U. S. 261
(1880); Dunham v. Hastings Pavement Co., 56 App. Div. 244, 67,N. Y. Supp. 632
(1900). But it was said in Jacobson v. Barnes, 176 Minn. 4, 222 N. W. 341, 342
(1928): "All else aside, a contract being declared upon, it is but logical to allow
proof of illegality under a general denial, for such proof simply shows no contract."
A similar situation appears to have developed in suits for divorce, where the rule
that affirmative defenses must be pleaded has been complicated by the factor of the
public's int-,est in the maintenance of the family. Thus, though it is generally-held
that condonation, Lipe v. Lipe, 327 I. 39, 158 N. E. 411 (1927), prior divorce,
Nichols v. Nichols, 189 Ky. 500, 225 S. W. 147 (1920), and adultery, Banks v. Banks,
118 Miss. 783, 79 So. 841 (1918), are not available as defenses to an action for
divorce unless specially pleaded, some courts have refused divorces where defenses
such as these were not pleaded but appeared in the proof. This is on the theory
that while the defendant may be concluded by his pleadings the judge is not; and
since the judge represents the state, which has a public policy to be served in
divorce actions, the judge may decide the case on the basis of a defense to the ac-
tion which does not appear in the pleadings. Giesselman v. Giesselman, 134 Md. 453,
107 At]. 185 (1919); Moore v. Moore, 41 Mo. App. 176 (1890); Amend v. Amend,
135 Ore. 550, 296 Pac. 875 (1931). See Note, 76 A.L.R. 990 (1932).
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made would have been illegal. This view has also been sanc-
tioned by the courts.'2
What is true of the defense of illegality-that it can be in-
terpreted in such a way as to fall within either of the gener-
ally recognized classes of pleas in bar-is also true of such
defenses as contributory negligence," the fellow servant rule,"
" In Finley v. Quirk, 9 Minn. 179 (1864), plaintiff sued to recover for breach
of warranty with respect to a horse he had purchased from the defendant. The
answer was a general denial. Under the general denial the defendant sought to
introduce evidence that the sale was made on a Sunday and therefore illegal. It was
held the evidence was properly excluded. though the defendant's counsel specifically
argued that the illegality of the sale should have been admissible because it went
to show that no valid contract had ever been made. The court said: "We hold,
therefore-first, that an answer, merely by way of denial, raises an issue only on
the facts alleged in the complaint; second that the denial of the sale of the horse
in this case only raised an issue on the sale in point of fact, and not on the question
of the legality of such sale; third, that all matters in confession and avoidance,
showing the contract sited upon to be either void or voidable in point of law, must
be affirmatively pleaded." 9 Alinn. 188-89. The case is vigorously approved in Ross,
Minnesota Pleading as Fact Pleading, 13 lMlinn. L. Rev. 348 (1929). See also Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8 (c), laying down the rule that illegality as a defense must be pleaded
in the federal courts.
13 Ordinarily, contributory negligence is held to le an affiriati, defuns, which
must be specially pleaded. Carr v. Soo Ry., 16 N. D. 217, 112 N. W. 972 (1907) '
Hall v. San Francisco, 188 Cal. 641, 206 Pac. 459 (1922); Francis v. Humphrey, 25
F. Supp. I (E. D. Ill. 1938). But some jurisdictions hold that the plaintiff iust
allege freedom from contributory negligence in order to state a cause of action in
negligence cases. Dee v. City of Peru, 343 Il1. 36, 174 N. E. 901 (1931); Walters
v. City of Ottawa, 240 I1. 259, 88 N. E. 651 (1909). In Francis v. Hlumphrey, snpra,
the plaintiff brought an action in the federal court to recover for injuries sustained
in an accident in Illinois. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8 (c), specify
that contributory negligence is regarded in the federal courts as an affirmative
defense and must be pleaded by the defendant. It was held that the plaintiff was
nevertheless bound to allege freedom from contributory negligence, since by the
substantive law of Illinois, applicable in the federal court, an allegation to that effect
was necessary to state a good cause of action.
" See, a. g., holding that the fellow servant rule must be pleaded before it is
available as a defense, Reeve v. Colusa Gas & Electric Co., 152 Cal. 99, 82 Pac. 89
(1907); Layng v. Mt. Shasta Mineral Spring Co., 135 Cal. 141, 67 Pac. 48 (1901);
O'Brien v Corra-Rock Island Mining Co., 40 Mont. 212, 105 Pac. 724 (1909) ; Millen
v. Pacific Bridge Co., 51 Ore. 538. 95 Pac. 196 (1908); Duff v. Willamette Iron &
Steel Works. 45 Ore. 479, 78 Pac. 363 (1904); East Tennessee & W.N.C. Ry. v.
Collins, 85 Tenn. 227, 1 S. W. 883 (1886); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (c). Contra: Pennsyl-
vania Co. v. Fishback, 123 Fed. 465 (6th Cir. 1903) ; Vinson v. Morning News, 118
Ga. 655, 45 S. E. 481 (1903); Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Blakeman, 54 I1. 201 (1870);
Big Hill Coal Co. v. Abney, 125 Ky. 355, 101 S. W. 394 (1907); Kaminski v. Tudor
Iron Works, 167 Me. 462, 67 S. W. 221 (1902); Dover v. Lockhart Mills, SG S. C.
229, 68 S. E. 525 (1910).
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assumption of risk," and the statute of frauds. " Thus, for
example, if one assumes that the effect of non-com-
pliance with the statute of frauds is to prevent the formation
of a contract, it is logical to assume that the statute of frauds
should be available to a defendant under a simple denial in
the case of actions based on contract. On the other hand, it
has been often held that the effect of the statute of frauds is
not to prevent the formation of a valid contract but merely
to deprive the plaintiff of the right to enforce it or recover
damages for its breach. If this view is adopted, proof of non-
compliance with the statute of frauds should be specially
pleaded before it could be available to a defendant. Depending
on their view of the effect of the statute, the courts have
adopted varying views," the more modern trend being to re-
quire the statute to be specially pleaded.'
What has been said should be sufficient to suggest the
idea that as presently interpreted by the courts the general
denial is both uncertain in its scope and unpredictable in its
operation. From the standpoint of the plaintiff who is faced
with an unexpected defense which has been allowed by the
court on the ground it is not matter in confession and
avoidance, it makes little difference whether the defense is
technically one in confession and avoidance or not. The es-
sential fact is still that he has been surprised, that an argu-
13 See, e. g., holding that assumption of risk must be pleaded, Lucid v. E. I. Du-
Pont De Nemours Powder Co., 199 Fed. 877 (9th Cir. 1912); Boin v Spreckels Sugar
Co., 155 Cal. 612, 102 Pac. 937 (1909); Coogan v. Aeolian Co., 87 Conn. 149, 87
Atl. 563 (1913); Warner v. Pittsburgh-Idaho Co., 38 Idaho 254, 220 Pac. 492 (1923);
Stevens v. Henningsen Produce Co., 53 Mont. 306, 163 Pac. 470 (1917); Union Stock-
Yards Co. v. Goodwin, 57 Neb. 138, 77 N. W. 357 (1898). Contra: New York, N. H. &
H. Ry. v. Vizvari, 210 Fed. 118 (2d Cir. 1913); Woodworth v. Iowa C. Ry., 170
Iowa 697, 149 N. W. 522 (1914); Cuoszo v. Clyde S. S. Co., 223 Mass. 521, 112
N. E. 521 (1916); Phillips v. Union P. Ry., 100 Neb. 157, 158 N. W. 966 (1916);
Dixon v. New York, 0. & W. Ry., 198 N. Y. 58, 91 N. E. 271 (1910); Shirley v.
Abbeville Furn. Co., 76 S. C. 452, 57 S. E. 178 (1907).
,6 It has clearly been settled in North Dakota that the Statute of Frauds Is not
available as - defense under a general denial. Abraham v. Durward, 46 N. D. 611,
180 N. W. 783 (1920). Cf. Groff v. Cook, 84 N. D. 126, 157 N. W. 973 (1916). S"
Erickson v. Wiper, 32 N. D. 193, 203, 157 N. W. 592, 595 (1916).
47 See, e. g. holding that the Statute of Frauds may be raised by a general denial,
Dunphy v. Ryan, 116 U. S. 491 (1886); May v. Sloan, 101 U. S. 231 (1879); Walsh
v. Standart, 174 Cal. 807, 164 Pac. 765 (1917); Jamison v. Christman, 95 Kan. 131,
148 Pac. 247 (1915); Bean v. Lamprey, 82 Minn. 320, 84 N. W. 1016 (1901); Mc-
Kee v. Rudd, 222 Mo. 344, 121 S. W. 312 (1908).
4 The Statute of Frauds must be pleaded under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (c). This Is also the rule in North Dakota. See cases cited
In note 46, supra. For a general discussion of this aspect of pleading see Thyson, The
General Denial in Missouri, 26 Wash. U.L.Q. 898, 400 et seq. (1941).
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ment has been raised which in many instances he is unpre-
pared to meet because unwarned to anticipate.
Tested by its function in the system of pleading, it is doubt-
ful whether any serious argument can be made that the gen-
eral denial serves a useful purpose. The American Bar Asso-
ciation has listed the purposes of the pleadings as follows: (1)
to serve as a formal basis for the judgment to be entered; (2)
to separate issues of fact from questions of law; (3) to give
litigants the advantage of the plea of res judicata if again
molested; and (4) to notify the parties of the claims, defenses
and cross demands of their adversaries." Of these, the modern
pleading systems tend to emphasize the fourth, or notice,
function." Yet of all pleadings, surely the general denial does
least to notify the adverse party of the defenses which it is
proposed to introduce. Indeed, its main purpose is ordinarily to
conceal the defenses to the plaintiff's action until the last
possible moment. It has been pointed out that it is only in ex-
ceptional cases that a plea of the general denial can be con-
sidered truthful; in not one case in a thousand can one party
deny in good faith every allegation of the other party's plead-
ing."
The efforts at reform have taken varying approaches to the
problem. In New York, Illinois and Michigan, statutes or
rules of court have been adopted which, following English
precedent, enumerate specific defenses which must be plead-
ed, irrespective of whether or not they are technically affirma-
tive in nature, coupled with a general requirement that any-
thing which might tend to surprise the adverse party should
be pleaded." This type of statute has been the subject of some
4 85 A. B. A. Rep. 614, 688-89 (1910), cited in Clark, Code Pleading 8 (2d ed.
1947).
50 Clark, Code Pleading 4 (2d ed. 1947).
m1 Sunderland, The New Federal Rules, 45 W. Va. L. Q. 5, 13 (1938); 1 Moore,
Federal Practice 562 (1938).
so Thus, the Illinois statute provides: "The facts constituting any affirmative
defense, such as payment, release, satisfaction, discharge, license, fraud, duress,
estoppel, laches, statute of frauds, illegality, that an instrument or transaction is
either void or voidable In point of law, or cannot be recovered upon by reason of
any statute or by reason of non-delivery, want or failure of consideration in whole
or in part, and any defense which by other affirmative matter seeks to avoid the
legal effect of or defeat the cause of action set forth in the plaintiff's complaint, or
the defendant's counterclaim, in whole or in part, and any ground or defense,
whether affirmative or not, which if not expressly stated in the pleading, would
be likely to take the opposite party by surprise, must be plainly set forth in the
answer or reply." Ill. L. 1933, p. 784, Smith-Hurd Ill. Stats. c. 110,§ 167.
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criticism on the ground that it makes the pleadings bulkier
and more intricate instead of tending to simplify them.'
The framers of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have
attempted to solve the problem in a slightly different fashion.
The federal rules provide that the general denial may be used
in the federal courts, but only where the pleader intends "in
good faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding
pleading...."' This section is followed by a listing of defenses
which it is required shall be set forth affirmatively. Included
among these are accord and satisfaction, arbitration and a-
ward, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge
in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud,
illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment,
release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations,
waiver, and "any other matter constituting an avoidance or
affirmative defense.'"' Coupled with these provisions are rules
providing for pre-trial conferences and extensive discovery
procedures, which give full opportunities to the parties to be-
come acquainted with all of the issues which will be raised at
the trial itself."
As so limited, the general denial is in effect prohibited in
the federal courts in all save the exceptional case where no
single allegation of the complaint is true.';
It is submitted, however, that for a state like North Da-
kota a rule or statute similar to those adopted in Michigan,
New York and Illinois would be more appropriate. Although
the North Dakota Code provides for a pre-trial conference
modeled after that provided for by the federal rules," the pro-
cedure does not appear to have come into general use in the
state. While statistics are not available, it is believed that very
few instances of the use of the pre-trial conference have oc-
curred in North Dakota.
It would seem wiser, therefore, to design any changes in the
present statute in such a way as to operate without the supple-
53 Thyson, The General Denial in Missouri, 26 Wash. U. L. Q. 398, 421 (1941).
54 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (b).
z Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (c).
56 Fed. R.* Civ. P. 16, and see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 through 37.
5' Sunderland, The Now Federal Rules, 45 W. Va. L. Q. 5, 13 (1938).
N. D. Rev. Code c. 28-11 (1943).
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mental assistance furnished by the pre-trial and discovery
procedures contemplated by the federal rules.
A rule which- provided a specific listing of the defenses
Which it is desired should be pleaded specially and added a
general provision requiring any matter which would tend to
surprise the other party to be also pleaded would have the
additional advantage of eliminating from the law of pleading
the over-technical common law distinction between defenses
which go to negative the direct allegations of the complaint
and defenses which are in confession and avoidance. The fed-
eral rules seem to contemplate a retention of the common law
distinction. This is indicated by the language of the rules,
which specify a number of specific defenses which should be
pleaded and then extend the requirement, as noted above, to
include matter "constituting an avoidance or affirmative de-
fense. '
The rule suggested here would be admittedly vague, con-
sidered as a general principle. It has, however, the advantage
of making the general policy behind the rule-that the plead-
ings should give notice of every important defense, whether
affirmative or not--clearly apparent on the face of the statute.
Furthermore, in practice the vagueness behind the rule
tends to be an advantage instead of a defect. By requiring a
party to plead every fact, whether affirmative or not, likely
to take the other party by surprise, the objective of notice
pleading is clearly attained. And the rule in its actual opera-
tion has been soundly tested by the experience of the New
York, Illinois and Michigan courts. To use the language of one
commentator, "The lawyer drawing the defensive pleading
resolves every doubt in favor of setting up the facts. He does
not want to take any chance of having his evidence excluded
on the trial."'
As was pointed out at the beginning of this discussion, the
section of our code dealing with the answer is over 82 years
old. Clearly, it has had time to "petrify." Serious consideration
might well be given to the desirability of an amendment to
our Code of Civil Procedure clearly specifying the defenses
" Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (c).
" Sunderland, Observations on the Illinois Civil Practice Act, 28 II). L. Rev. 861,
867 (1934).
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which should be specially pleaded and eliminating the con-
fusing and ambiguous common law distinction between denials
and defenses in confession and avoidance.
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